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POSTAL BANKING
IT’S TIME FOR
The USPS should help extend banking services to the unbanked population.
ne of the biggest problems in 
banking today is the large and 
ever-increasing population of the 
unbanked – those who are not gaining the 
beneﬁts of the regulated banking system 
and must rely on high-cost fringe lenders 
to do simple transactions like cash their 
paychecks. The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation and the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau have listed this problem 
as a top agenda item.1  After decades of 
unsuccessful regulatory proposals, the 
solution may ﬁnally be at hand. 
On January 27, 2014, the Ofﬁce of the 
Inspector General of the U.S. Postal Service 
(USPS) released a white paper that proposed 
that the USPS consider offering ﬁnancial 
services to the underbanked.2 Senator 
Elizabeth Warren has also publicly expressed 
support for the idea.3 
The proposal was immediately criticized 
by the banking industry as “the worst 
idea since the Edsel.”4 The main stated 
concern is that the Post Ofﬁce lacks the 
institutional capacity to provide ﬁnancial 
services.5 But anticompetitive concerns 
– namely that a large, well-funded 
competitor will cut into banks’ business – 
likely play a role too, as they did in 2005 
when Walmart attempted to obtain a 
banking charter.6
As I have written previously,7 
and banking-industry concerns 
notwithstanding, the USPS is in a unique 
position to provide much-needed ﬁnancial 
services for the large population of 
unbanked or underbanked Americans.8 
First, the Post Ofﬁce can offer credit 
at lower rates than fringe lenders by 
taking advantage of economies of scale 
as well as its position in the federal 
bureaucracy. Second, it already has branches 
in many low-income neighborhoods that 
have been long deserted by commercial 
banks. And third, people at every level of 
society, including the unbanked, have a 
level of familiarity and comfort with the 
Post Ofﬁce that they do not have with more 
formal banking institutions.
This essay moves one step further by 
demonstrating why government support 
and even subsidies to enable postal banking 
in the United States are appropriate and 
justiﬁable. 
First, banking-related subsidies 
are grounded in historical practice, as 
demonstrated by government support 
for credit unions, savings and loans, and 
student loan associations. Postal banking 
derives from these longstanding practices, 
but broadens the scope to include the poor, 
not just the middle class. 
Further, state support of banking 
throughout U.S. history has operated much 
like a social contract: the state supports the 
banking system in a variety of ways and, in 
return, banks serve as credit intermediaries, 
providing the populace with access to loans 
and ﬁnancial services. Thus, subsidies for 
banking have been justiﬁed because they 
provide a beneﬁt to all citizens. 
Mainstream banks have met part of 
their obligation, but a large portion of the 
population, namely the poor, has been left 
out. It is time, then, for the government 
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I. How the Post Ofﬁce 
Can Bank the Unbanked
The unbanked and underbanked 
population in the United States is 
signiﬁcant, with far-reaching consequences. 
Approximately 88 million people in 
the United States, 38% of the population, 
are unbanked or underbanked.9 Indeed, 
nearly half of U.S. adults could not access 
$2000 within thirty days to respond to an 
emergency.10 
To meet their short-term credit needs, 
these individuals and families must rely 
on payday lenders, check cashers, or other 
fringe banking institutions. These lenders 
are often usurious, sometimes predatory, 
and almost always much worse for low-
income individuals than the services offered 
by traditional banks to their customers. 
For instance, the average annual income 
for an unbanked family is $25,500, and 
about 10% of that income, or $2412, 
goes to the fees and interest paid to access 
credit or other ﬁnancial services – services 
that those with bank accounts often get 
for free.11 Cutting down these payments 
would help many avoid bankruptcy; those 
who ﬁled for bankruptcy in 2012 were, 
on average, just $26 per month short of 
meeting their expenses.12 
The Post Ofﬁce can address 
this problem and lower these 
credit costs for the three 
reasons outlined below.
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There are economic justiﬁcations 
for charging higher interest rates to those 
with lower incomes. The poor pay more for 
credit than the middle class because they 
are more likely to default and lenders must 
be compensated for assuming this risk. In 
other words, those least likely to be able to 
pay their debts are charged a premium for 
that inability. 
But even assuming that the risk presented 
by low-income borrowers is accurately 
priced by fringe lenders (a proposition 
that the available data does not strongly 
support13), the Post Ofﬁce can still provide 
these services at a lower price. In fact, the 
USPS white paper claims that the Post Ofﬁce 
could offer a $375 loan with interest and 
fees totaling $48, as opposed to $520 for the 
average payday loan for that amount.14 
This discount is possible because the 
Post Ofﬁce is able to operate with less 
overhead than fringe lenders and because 
it can beneﬁt from economies of scale. It 
could reduce costs by using its existing 
infrastructure and clientele. 
In addition, its collection costs could 
be lower because it may be able to enlist 
the help of the IRS and other federal 
enforcement mechanisms that can easily 
garnish wages or tax returns.15 
It can also offer smaller individual loans 
that yield smaller margins by doing so at a 
greater volume.
B. PROXIMITY
Moreover, the Post Ofﬁce is uniquely 
positioned to solve the problems of credit 
access for the poor because Post Ofﬁces 
remain in the low-income neighborhoods 
that banks abandoned.
The banking industry underwent a 
signiﬁcant transformation during the 1970s 
and 1980s as mainstream commercial banks 
faced increased competition from other 
ﬁnancial institutions. This market pressure on 
traditional banks was a result of technological 
advances coupled with swift deregulation.16 
Forced to compete, banks shed their 
less-proﬁtable products, namely small 
loans to lower income communities. The 
poor may need banks, but the reverse is 
certainly not true. 
Many mainstream banks hold the 
position that “[p]roviding ﬁnancial 
services to the poor is fundamentally 
unproﬁtable.”17 Assuming the same risk of 
default, it costs a bank roughly the same 
amount of overhead and transactional 
costs to lend $1000 as it does $100,000, 
with the latter yielding a greater proﬁt. 
In pursuit of higher proﬁt margins, 
banks closed branches in lower-income 
neighborhoods en masse. And once they 
did, the fringe lenders moved in.18 Thus, 
a signiﬁcant barrier to banking the poor 
is the dearth of bank branches in low-
income areas. 
Chartered banks are regulated by state 
and federal laws and therefore have usury 
limits, or interest rate caps, on the loans 
they can offer. Fringe lenders do not. Once 
the regulated banks left these communities, 
so did reasonable interest rates. 
For decades, banking regulators and 
advocacy groups have been trying to 
lure mainstream banks back to these 
neighborhoods through legislation and 
agency action, using both carrots and 
sticks.19 These efforts have not succeeded 
and have faced signiﬁcant industry 
opposition. 
Post Ofﬁces, on the other hand, have 
always been a part of nearly every zip 
code across the country. This fact, above 
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The third major advantage of postal 
banking is that Post Ofﬁces provide a 
more welcoming atmosphere, overcoming 
many cultural barriers that lead the 
poor to avoid banks. Analyzing the 
demographics of the unbanked while 
controlling for income reveals that there 
are racial and cultural barriers that keep 
many people away from banking. 
For example, more blacks and Hispanics 
are unbanked than whites, as are more 
women than men.20 Many of the unbanked 
report being more comfortable in fringe 
banking institutions than in banks.21 
Payday lenders deal behind a facade 
of informality. They operate in cash, in 
the direct vicinity of their customers, and 
usually in their language. This business 
model seems to be in direct contrast to 
banks with their rigid hours, requirements, 
and procedures.
While the Post Ofﬁce will not be 
able to overcome all of these barriers, its 
branches are more accessible places than 
commercial banks because of their presence 
in low-income neighborhoods and their 
informality. The Post Ofﬁce is not an 
intimidating institution; the poor know its 
location and understand its processes. 
For all the Post Ofﬁce’s ﬂaws, rich and 
poor across the country are familiar with 
its locations and often even the postal 
employees behind the counter.22
To be sure, there are private institutions 
with similar capacities, but they are not 
likely to provide a solution anytime soon. 
Walmart, for example, recently started 
offering simple ﬁnancial services, such 
as check cashing and prepaid cards, at a 
discount to its customers.23 However, the 
retail giant, having been deﬁnitively denied 
a banking charter, cannot offer credit – the 
most-needed ﬁnancial product. 
The postal system, in contrast, is 
well positioned to overcome most 
of the hurdles to banking the poor 
due to its ability to take advantage of 
economies of scale, its presence in poorer 
neighborhoods, and its long-standing 
relationship of trust with all of America’s 
communities.
II. Why the U.S. 
Government Should 
Support Postal Banking
The opposition to postal banking is 
likely to center on the idea that this service 
functions as an inappropriate federal 
subsidy to the poor. But any 
direct or indirect subsidy of 
banking access for the poor is 
supported both historically and 
theoretically.
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Postal banking is not unprecedented in 
the United States. In 1873, President Grant’s 
Postmaster General proposed a government-
sponsored savings program, modeled after 
one started in Britain.24 
In 1910, President Taft responded to 
growing populist proposals to establish 
a government-backed savings system for 
recent immigrants and the poor.25 The Postal 
Savings System was created to enable the 
poor to save money with the assurance of 
a government guarantee that their deposits 
were protected.26 
This program was created and geared to 
recent immigrants and the unbanked poor, 
and was wildly successful: at the end of the 
ﬁrst year, there was a total of $20 million in 
deposits, “most of which had been coaxed 
out of hiding.”27 
The director of postal savings, Carter 
Keene, declared in 1913 that the postal 
savings system was not meant to yield a 
proﬁt: “Its aim is inﬁnitely higher and more 
important. Its mission is to encourage thrift 
and economy among all classes of citizens. It 
stands for good citizenship and tends to 
diminish crime. It places savings facilities 
at the very doors of those living in remote 
sections, and it also affords opportunity for 
safeguarding the savings of thousands who 
have absolute conﬁdence in the Government 
and will trust no other institution.”28 
Throughout American history, there 
have been various state-supported 
attempts to meet the banking needs of the 
poor – both for depositary services and 
credit. Policymakers have largely recognized 
that access to ﬁnancial services and credit 
is a signiﬁcant step toward individual 
economic advancement.29 
Credit gives the poor the ability to 
absorb ﬁnancial reversals, the means to 
start or expand a small business, and the 
capacity to build a ﬁnancial cushion to 
withstand individual economic shocks.30 
Several studies have demonstrated 
that when poor communities are 
provided access to credit and 
other banking services, they 
thrive economically.31 Studies also 
show that small-scale credit leads 
to increased income and savings 
among borrowers.32 The converse is 
also true: barriers to credit signiﬁcantly 
hamper the economic development of 
poor communities and individuals.33
For most of this country’s history, 
the credit needs of the poor and middle 
class were met by banking institutions 
speciﬁcally created and designed to 
appeal to them, such as credit unions, 
savings and loan associations, and the 
smaller Morris Banks.34 
Credit unions were a populist 
innovation designed as cooperatives not 
only to provide access to credit, but also 
to provide federal insurance to protect 
investments.35 
Savings and loan associations (S&Ls) 
were formally created in the 1930s 
to offer affordable mortgage loans to 
lower- and middle-class people.36 These 
institutions began as cooperatives with 
shared ownership, a structure that led to 
the forbearance of proﬁt.37 
In contrast, the little-known Morris 
Bank was a for-proﬁt banking venture 
aimed at the “democratization of credit,” 
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Credit unions, S&Ls, and Morris Banks 
were alternatives to mainstream banks, but 
they were all supported and subsidized by 
the federal government through targeted 
regulation and deposit insurance protection.39
As described above, banking 
forms homogenized in the 
1970s and 1980s, leaving 
little room for variation in 
institutional or regulatory 
design.40 Eventually, each 
of these institutions drifted 
from their initial mission of 
serving the poor and began to look 
more like commercial banks, even competing 
with them for ever-shrinking proﬁt margins. 
The result now is essentially two forms 
of banks: regulated mainstream banks that 
seek maximum proﬁt for their shareholders 
by serving the needs of the wealthy and 
middle class, and unregulated fringe 
banks that seek maximum proﬁts for their 
shareholders by serving the banking and 
credit needs of the poor. 
What is missing from the American 
banking landscape for the ﬁrst time in almost 
a century is a government-sponsored bank 
whose main purpose is to meet the needs of 
the poor. Rather than relegating the poor to 
fringe banks, policymakers should carve out a 
place for banks that serve the poor and enable 
them to survive and thrive. This charge has 
deep historic roots in U.S. banking. 
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As I have written elsewhere, the state 
has always had a social contract with its 
banks, which at times has been explicit and 
at times implicit, but always with the same 
understanding: the state provides banks 
with public trust (through insurance and 
implicit bailouts) – trust that is necessary 
for their survival; in return, banks provide 
much-needed credit, savings, and ﬁnancial 
intermediation services for individuals and 
institutions.41 
Currently, a few large and powerful 
banks, who continue to beneﬁt from 
trillions of dollars of federal government 
subsidies, control the majority of assets 
in the banking sector and also the 
majority of credit.42 And this credit is 
not reaching the poor.43 
If the banking system is to be 
supported by the government, the 
entire citizenry should be able to 
access its services. 
Insofar as a heavily subsidized 
banking sector is the status quo and 
that sector does not beneﬁt the entire 
population, a government subsidy to 
lend to the poor simply provides another 
mechanism for reaching the same policy 
goals. And if the banks beneﬁting from 
subsidies are no longer taking up the task, 
the government should do so directly.
The federal government subsidizes 
other credit products to achieve 
important policy goals but, thus far, 
these programs have been primarily 
designed for the middle class. 
The government sponsors and 
underwrites private student loans. A 
student borrower who qualiﬁes for such 
a loan receives credit at a below-market 
interest rate and remains indebted to 
the government until the loan is paid 
off. The government supports such loans 
because they facilitate an important public 
objective – educating the population. 
The government also creates and 
supports a secondary mortgage market to 
promote the policy goal of increased 
home ownership.44 
Enabling the poor to escape 
poverty is no less important a public 
concern. Offering good credit to the 
poor would enable economic mobility, 
which has lagged signiﬁcantly in the 
United States in recent years, and solve a 
variety of other public problems linked to 
entrenched poverty. 
Given the recent debacles of federally 
funded institutions such as Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac,45 the federal 
government would have to be cautious 
in taking on risks associated with 
lending to the poor. However, these 
services do not entail the scope of risks 
associated with home mortgages. Cashing 
a check for a small fee or offering a payday 
loan often involve much less risk.
After the recent global ﬁnancial crisis, 
any call for easing credit of any kind is 
suspect because of the widespread, yet 
inaccurate, belief that the ﬁnancial crisis 
was precipitated by an overabundance 
of consumer access to mortgage 
credit.46 Therefore, the case for increasing 
consumer access to credit is a politically 
difﬁcult one to make. 
However, the status quo is not sustainable 
as onerous interest rates make it much more 
difﬁcult for individuals to escape poverty 
and growing income disparity has various 
negative economic effects.47 
Bank credit not only allows the economy 
to grow wealth, but also allows individual 
families to do so. Any difference in credit 
access undermines the justiﬁcations for state 
support of banks. 
Insofar as economic mobility is a social 
good, and credit is a necessary tool for 
economic advancement, government 
policies should be aimed at enhancing access 
for all individuals and communities. Access 
to safe credit is crucial in allowing the poor 
to escape poverty.
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One thing that could undermine 
postal banking would be inappropriate 
proﬁt-seeking. Attempts to regulate the 
private market have demonstrated that 
institutions with an eye toward proﬁt 
maximization have been unable or 
unwilling to meet the credit needs 
of the poor.48 
In February 2008, the FDIC 
began the “Small-Dollar Loan 
Pilot Program,” a two-year campaign to 
enlist mainstream banks to lend to the 
poor.49 The project was described as “a 
case study designed to illustrate how banks 
can proﬁtably offer affordable small-dollar 
loans as an alternative to high-cost credit 
products, such as payday loans and fee-
based overdraft protection.”50 
The program, which enlisted twenty-
eight volunteer banks, was a failure. A 
congressional review committee noted that 
banks were charging the maximum rates 
www.law.uga.edu14 Advocate 2015
allowed in the program –  
36% APR and 20% charges on 
cashed checks, which were not 
much better than payday loans.51 
The main reason this program 
failed is that mainstream banks do 
not have the incentive to sacriﬁce proﬁts 
to meet the needs of the poor. They 
must survive and stay proﬁtable in a 
competitive banking market, and when 
they offer low-cost loans to the poor, they 
lose their competitive position and hurt 
their bottom line. 
Policymakers misunderstand the 
nature of mainstream banks if they are 
relying on them to adequately meet the 
needs of the poor. 
At best, banks can be incentivized to 
meet the poor’s banking needs merely 
to appease regulators. The products the 
banks offer are not innovative fruits of 
market research about what the poor 
really need – the banks offer the bare 
minimum so that they can maintain 
proﬁtability while fulﬁlling a regulatory 
mandate.52 Forcing banks, whose 
purpose is to maximize proﬁts, to make 
loans to the poor will inevitably lead 
to inadequate loans and disgruntled 
bankers.
Credit unions, S&Ls, and Morris 
Banks, in contrast, were able to 
successfully reach the poor because doing 
so was their primary goal. And so it must 
be with the Post Ofﬁce. 
There is a troubling statement in the 
USPS white paper on this front. The 
paper states that providing these services 
“could result in major new revenue for 
the Postal Service.”53 This motive cannot 
be the driving force behind this endeavor 
or else, as the pilot program example 
proved, it is unlikely to reach the goal 
of offering the poor the credit that they 
need. 
This is not to say that the venture will 
not be a major new revenue source for 
the USPS. And the competition provided 
by the government entering this sector 
could possibly drive prices down in the 
private fringe banking sector to more 
accurately reﬂect the risks of lending to 
the poor.
III. Conclusion
Income disparity is greater in 
the United States than ever before, 
and the banking industry is more 
heavily subsidized than at any 
point in U.S. history. The result 
should be an increase in credit 
to those who most need it. 
Unfortunately, the reverse is 
happening – the poor have been 
excluded from the credit ﬂowing from 
the subsidized banking sector. Any 
efforts at forcing that sector to 
provide credit to the poor have 
failed because they are institutionally 
designed to maximize proﬁts and 
lending to the poor is not conducive 
to proﬁt maximization. 
It is time for the government to step in 
and solve this market mismatch. The USPS 
is far from the most efﬁcient or successful 
government agency, but it may just be 
the perfect institution to accomplish the 
monumental undertaking of providing the 
credit the poor need to escape poverty.
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